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I. INTRODUCTION

This Note examines how differences in U.S. and German variants of
federalism have contributed to the formation and development of the
dual banking system in the United States and the three-pillar banking
system in Germany. Specifically, this Note considers the manner in
which federalism has informed the respective banking systems' reactions
to dynamic changes in the global banking industry and analyzes the role
*
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federalism has played in contributing to or impeding reform efforts in
the United States and Germany.
U.S. federalism has limited the regulatory powers of the states in the
field of banking considerably. This power dynamic provides the federal
government with a trump when it chooses to accomplish system-wide
reform, thus rendering consolidation of the U.S. banking system more
achievable once a consensus is reached at the national level. The U.S.
federal government's broad powers to legislate for and regulate the banking industry enable the federal government to create a facilitative
framework for reform and, if need be, implement reforms to a point
where the very suitability of the label-the dual banking system, which
implies some sort of parity among federal and state regulatory bodiesis questionable. As a result, policies backed by a national consensus, as
defined by a public choice or a public interest paradigm, are arguably
effectuated in the United States with greater ease. Given the U.S. variant
of federalism, reform of the regulatory scheme is dependent on the attainment of a government consensus at the federal level sufficient to pass
new legislation or, at a minimum, to allow for the introduction of a new
regulatory paradigm that would manifest itself through agency action.'
In contrast, the German variant of federalism protects the institutional arrangement of the three-pillar banking system, the contours of
which were heavily influenced by longstanding constituent state aims of
achieving certain public policies.2 Because the German system is not as
malleable as its U.S. counterpart, the prospect of developing a more
profit-efficient banking structure through greater consolidation is hampered. Notwithstanding reform efforts by private actors that are similar
in intensity to those that have taken place in the United States, the extensive network of German subnational public-sector banks can still impede
regulatory and structural reform of the banking system through reliance
on extensive support from their public backers. As a result, the dominant
1.
For example, the national bank regulator's reading of the "closely related to banking" standard with respect to what kind of securities activities bank holding companies could
engage in was significantly liberalized during the 1980s and 1990s in conjunction with a
growing perception at the national level that the separation of banking and securities was not
efficiency-enhancing. Chevron deference allowed the national bank regulator to act decisively
to bring down this barner in the banking system without having to go to Congress, where the
regulator could encounter opposition to liberalization. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P.
MILLER

& RICHARD

SCOTT CARNELL, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION

443-44 (2001).

2.
Involvement of subnational entities in the banking industry, with the principal aim
of offering the poor and the middle class a place to put their money, predates the postwar period. For example, forty-six percent of the 1,765 Sparkassen operating in Prussia in 1913
belonged to a city. Around twenty-three percent belonged to a county, and ten percent were
either privately held or belonged to an association. Timothy W. Guinnane, Delegated Monitors, Large and Small: Germany's Banking System, 1800-1914, 40 J. EcON. LITERATURE 73,
85 (2002).
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position of the subnational public-sector pillar in Germany is maintained
by virtue of its entrenched political status, a status that is perpetuated by
the numerous disincentives at the grassroots and constituent state levels
to enact far-reaching reforms of Germany's financial architecture. The
very subnational governmental entities that would otherwise serve as the
main avenues to effect change under Germany's constitutional scheme
are arguably the entities most interested in maintaining the status quo.
These constitutional protections provide some beneficiaries of the status
quo banking system with veto power that they can wield against reform
efforts aimed at changing the legal status and the market behavior of the
subnational public-sector banks.
While the German federal government, or Bund, could introduce a
framework that would, to an extent, facilitate efficiency-enhancing
change to the banking system,3 the Bund is unable to serve as the effective implementer of reform by using its legislative and regulatory powers
to rearrange market incentives to precipitate system-wide change and,
ultimately, cross-pillar consolidation of the German banking system. In
view of Germany's banking structure, and the constraints that its variant
of federalism places on the manner in which the Bund is able to exercise
its powers to legislate and regulate, the Bund faces more hurdles than its
U.S. counterpart in forcing change on the banking field even if a nominal
consensus is reached on the national level.
Unlike the United States, the achievement of structural reform of the
German banking system would require reformers to persuade individual
regional governments and their respective subunits to refrain from interfering in an area of the economy that these public entities directly
influence, and from which they derive benefit. The current configuration
of German bank regulation, which is embedded to a large extent at the
superstructure level of the banking system-in addition to being effectuated through regulatory bodies that play a supervisory role over the
entire banking system-is likely to remain largely unchanged for the
foreseeable future. As such, the structure of the German banking system
appears entrenched, a predicament illustrated by the formidable battle
that reformers face in convincing subnational political entities to carry
out reforms, given that many such reforms may be adverse to these subnational governments' economic interests even though they may be
welfare enhancing at the national level.
The operations of banks in both the United States and Germany have
been constrained by regulatory systems that further many of the same
public policies. Such public policy goals include promoting safety and
3.
This analysis assumes that such a framework is not collectively blocked by the
Lander by virtue of their power in the Bundesrat. See infra Section IV.B.
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soundness in the banking sector, ensuring the effectiveness of monetary
policy, preserving a degree of local control over the regional or local
economy, promoting the supply of credit to all market segments, encouraging community reinvestment, and enhancing consumer protection. In
the United States, these public policies are implemented to a greater extent by regulation of a supervisory nature, albeit they occasionally take a
form that is structurally intrusive. In Germany, on the other hand, public
policies are largely achieved in structurally intrusive ways, which in conjunction with the German variant of federalism give rise to banking
institutions and practices that are largely shielded from reform due to the
indirect constitutional protection they enjoy.'
Part II of this Note provides background on the global consolidation
trend in various banking markets. Part III discusses the impact of U.S.styled federalism on the development of the U.S. banking system. Part
IV discusses the role of the German variant of federalism on the development of the German banking system and argues that German
federalism, in contrast to its U.S. counterpart, imposes constraints on the
development of the German banking system by protecting subnational
public-sector banks6 at the expense of other pillars of the banking system, in particular the commercial banking pillar. The competitive
advantage that the public-sector banks enjoy, derived from both overt
and subtle public backing-a practice entrenched by Germany's variant
of federalism-hampers the competitive position of banks in other pillars. As a result, the development of the German financial system, when
using bank profitability as a proxy, is stymied in both a static and dynamic manner. Part V argues that U.S. constitutional constraints and

4.
An example of a structurally intrusive law is the Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 7366, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (repealed in part 1999).
5.
A salient example of how the U.S. and German banking systems promote public
policies in different ways is the manner in which each system attempts to fulfill the goal of
providing banking services to the poor. In the United States, banks are obligated to service low
income and minority areas in order to obtain a satisfactory Community Reinvestment Act
evaluation, a factor that bank regulators take into account when approving mergers with or
acquisitions of other banks. See Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community
Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 513, 517 (2005). In Germany, however,
one of the very purposes of subnational public sector banks is to serve low income market
segments. See ULRICH IMMENGA & JOACHIM RUDO, UNLIMITED LIABILITY OF STATE-OWNED
BANKS UNDER THE EC-RULES OF STATE AIDs 6 (1998).
6.
In terms of total bank assets and liabilities, subnational public-sector banks comprise a substantial part of the German banking system and are accorded indirect constitutional
protection. See infra Part IV.
7.
The scope of this Note is limited to the consideration of the impact of federalism on
the execution of efficiency-enhancing reforms that promote or facilitate consolidation of the
banking sector in the United States and Germany. In the case of Germany, this Note focuses in
particular on reform that would give rise to cross-pillar consolidation.
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jurisprudential precedent show that a banking system similar to that of
the three-pillar system could not develop in the United States.
II. BACKGROUND

Global banking markets, and the firms operating therein, have undergone significant restructuring over the last twenty years. By the
1990s, there was a growing appreciation worldwide that many of the
public policy aims that justified a significant portion of banking regulation could be achieved via less structurally intrusive regulatory schemes. 8
Technological advances, including improvements in communication,
product standardization, and reductions in the cost of processing information, have equipped global banks to expand over geographies, giving
rise to institutions that are able to translate economies of scale and scope
into higher profits. Bank regulators across the globe have taken note of
the utility of greater bank consolidation, viewing it as a principal means
of achieving enhanced efficiencies within the banking sector.9
Underlying this policy shift is the premise that by removing barriers
to greater market concentration, dominant banks will be better positioned to conduct business with efficiently sized units, generating more
profit from enhanced economies of scale and scope.' ° As an illustration,
consolidation tends to improve a banking market's cost-to-income ratio.
The number of banks operating in a country influences this ratio because
8.
A significant amount of regulation is geared toward preventing bank failure, a particularly bad externality that can impair the banking system, disrupt the payment system, hurt
the real economy, and complicate monetary policy. Newer forms of regulation, such as functional regulation and self-regulation, attempt to prevent bank failure in a less intrusive manner.
It is difficult, however, to quantify the success of these new regulatory measures. Nonetheless,
the calls for deregulation were clearly perceptible by the late 1970s, and have since been a
major theme among bank regulators. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A
Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1977) ("Banking quite possibly is the most extensively regulated of all industries, and there is a growing body of opinion
that much of the regulation is ineffectual, costly to the public and, in view of the existence of
federal deposit insurance since 1933, redundant.").
9.
In the United States, for example, the watershed moment occurred when the Treasury Department began talking about U.S. "superbanks" that would compete with comparable
banks in Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. See CARL FELSENFELD, BANKING
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 208 (2d ed. 2006). See also Reinhard Lahusen, Bank
Performance in Europe: Great Progress Through Consolidation-Except in Germany,
DEUTSCHE BANK RES.

EU

MONITOR,

June 28, 2004, at 4 (noting also that over the past few

years, many European countries have witnessed the emergence of large, influential, profitable
banks operating in increasingly concentrated domestic banking markets).
10.
Lahusen, supra note 9, at 5 ("Even though market structures are only one type of
cause [of lower financial results in comparison to other domestic banking systems]alongside cyclical factors and the strategic orientation of the banks-the German banks would
be considerably more successful if the peculiarities of the German system were brought into
line with standard international practice.").
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the ratio implicitly factors in, for example, the cost of operating headquarters facilities, which are more numerous in diffuse banking systems.
Germany has the highest banking density in Europe, posting 3.1 banks
per 100,000 inhabitants, which has a detrimental effect on the banking
system's relative efficiency and profitability." In contrast, the United
Kingdom has .6 banks per 100,000 inhabitants.'2 In Germany, the top
five banks control less than twenty percent of total domestic assets. 3 In
the United States, just three banking institutions hold twenty-five percent
of the nation's domestic deposits.' 4 Furthermore, the German banking
sector employs more people than the banking sectors of France and Italy
combined. 5 In terms of productivity, on average German banks trail U.S.
banks by thirteen percent.' 6 As bank regulators in many of the large industrialized economies view greater consolidation in a more favorable
light, regulators in profit-lagging banking systems are under pressure to
take deliberate steps to facilitate market concentration, lest the banks
operating under their jurisdiction fall behind in relative competitiveness.
III. THE IMPACT OF U.S.-STYLED FEDERALISM ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BANKING SYSTEM

Scholarly literature has referred to the U.S. banking system as a dual
banking system, a categorization that is a reflection of overlapping federal and state regulatory jurisdiction over members of the banking
sector. 7 Although the U.S. dual banking system may intimate a system
of dual federalism, implying that banks operating within the jurisdiction
of the United States are subject to two separate, equally powerful, and
distinct juridical systems, such a portrayal does not appropriately describe the legal reality.

II.
12.

Id. at 3.
Id.

13.

Andreas Hackethal, German Banks and Banking Structure, in THE GERMAN FI71, 75 (Jan P. Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt eds., 2004) (noting that the

NANCIAL SYSTEM

European average was fifty-seven percent in 1999).
14.
Kenneth D. Jones & Tim Critchfield, Consolidationin the U.S. Banking Industry: Is
the "Long, Strange Trip" About to End?, 17 FDIC BANKING REv. 31, 35 (2005) (stating that
in 1984, forty-two banks held this same amount in deposits).
15.
Bank Saturation Point, FIN. TIMES EUR. INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Mar. 24, 2005.
16.
Laura Cohn, David Fairlamb & Andy Reinhardt, Productivity Paralysis, BusiNESSWEEK, Aug. 2, 2004, at 54 (positing that the legal separation of commercial, savings, and
cooperative banks impedes productivity by preventing consolidation).
17.
See, e.g., MACEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 12. ("The dual system has remained a
pervasive feature of American banking law and regulation up to the present day, although by
now the accident of its birth is often forgotten.").
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Commentators have remarked that while politicians on the federal
level have tweaked aspects of the dual banking system, any dramatic
change to its underpinnings has traditionally been blocked by its "shcred
cow" status in the American political tradition.' 8 However, the power
imbalance in favor of the federal government in light of the Commerce
and Supremacy Clauses undermines the suitability of the dual banking
system label.' 9 While the perception of the existence of a more equal
dual banking system20 lends credibility and force to political safeguards
for a variant of federalism that, depending on the strength of such safeguards, shifts regulatory power in the field of banking to the constituent
states, the supremacy of federal regulatory powers nonetheless renders
the dual banking system label somewhat artificial. 2' Due to U.S.-styled
federalism, typified by its asymmetric distribution of federal-state powers, constitutional concerns with respect to preserving a state role in the
realm of banking give way to efficiency-enhancing regulatory preferences once a national consensus is reached to take such a reform path.
To gain a better idea of how the dual banking system developed and
to better understand its malleability in the hands of the U.S. version of
federalism, Section A will analyze the development of U.S. banking
regulation through the rubric of federalism. Section B will then analyze
how the underlying asymmetric power dynamic of U.S.-styled federalism has contributed to consolidation of the banking system. Specifically,
it will look at this phenomenon in the context of the relaxation of regional restrictions on banks, and the role that U.S. federalism played in
paving the way for a more profit-efficient institutional banking arrangement.

See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L.
1, 1-2 (1987) ("[Qluestioning the underlying premise of the dual banking system has
traditionally been outside the borders of permissible political discourse.").
19.
See Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest
for Deregulation, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 1,21 (2006).
20.
See, e.g., Scott, supra note 8, at 1 (1977) ("The dual banking system ... is a vital
national goal with roots deep in our constitutional history, and one of the very reasons why
this country has achieved an economic growth unparalleled among the nations of the world.")
(quoting F. Shelby Cullom, a representative of the National Association of Supervisors of
18.

REV.

State Banks).
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548-554 (1985)
21.
(reasoning that the proper safeguards of federalism in preventing congressional overreach and,
more specifically, preventing Congress exercise of its commerce powers, is in the very design
of the federal government, by virtue of state indirect representation in the Senate, House of
Representatives, and electoral college, thus obviating the need for the cultivation of a "sacred
province of state activity").
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A. The Development of U.S. Banking Regulation
through the Rubric of Federalism
Unlike the Canadian Constitution Act 22 and the German Grundgesetz, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly grant the federal
government powers over banking.24 However, the U.S. federal government may regulate banking through its Commerce and Supremacy
Clause powers.2 ' Around the time of the drafting of the Constitution,
state-chartered banks existed in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.26
During the United States' formative years, a significant question was
whether the federal government's constitutional powers were such that it
could charter a national bank.
In the landmark case, McCulloch v. Maryland,27 the Supreme Court
answered whether, and by what right, the federal government could establish a bank. Chief Justice Marshall, in interpreting the federal
commerce power to prohibit Maryland from taxing the federally chartered central bank, sustained Congress' power to charter a national
bank.2 9 Later, Justice Jackson wrote in FranklinNational Bank of Franklin Square v. People of the State of New York 0 that ever since McCulloch
v. Maryland, "it has not been open to question that the Federal Government may constitutionally create and govern [national banks] within the
states.'', Furthermore, the United States established this system of national banks as federal instrumentalities to perform various functions
related to credit allocation, including "providing circulating medium and
government credit, as well as financing commerce and acting as private
depositaries. 32 The ability of these banks to perform such functions depends on their capacity to attract private deposits." Justice Jackson stated
"[tihat these federal institutions may be at no disadvantage in competi23

22.
See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), § 91 (Can.) (describing the
legislative authority of the Canadian Parliament to regulate trade and commerce, impose taxes,
and regulate shipping, the sea coast, and inland fisheries).
23.
See Grundgesetz fiir
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law], May 23,
1949, art. 74(1)11 [hereinafter Grundgesetz]. The Grundgesetz is the German Federal Constitution. A translation is available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt.
24.
The U.S. Constitution does grant the federal government the power to "coin
[m]oncy" and "regulate the [v]alue thereof." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
5.

25.
26.

See Macey, supra note 19, at 21.
See MACEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id.
Id.
347 U.S. 373 (1954).
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
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tion with state-created institutions, the Federal
'34 Government has frequently expanded their functions and authority.
For example, after the failure of the Bank of the United States and
the subsequent turmoil of the free banking era, the federal government,
led by Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase, sought to establish a federal
free-banking regime through the issuance of federal charters.35 The federal free-banking regime was set out in the National Currency Act of
1863 and the National Bank Act of 1864, but to Secretary Chase's dismay, few state banks converted to national charters, largely because
federal regulators were stricter than state regulators.36 In an effort to induce state banks to become nationally chartered banks, and thus switch
chartering authorities, Congress imposed a ten percent tax on bank notes
in 1865. State banks unsuccessfully challenged the tax on constitutional
grounds, 8 but they maintained their competitive advantage and independence from federal regulatory interference by developing the
checking account, which provided state banks the means of avoiding the
punitive features of the tax on bank notes.39 State banks, however, have
had to stay two steps ahead to preserve their competitive niche in the
face of strong federal regulatory powers that frequently favor national
banks over state banks. While agile state banks can occasionally exploit
technological and product innovation ahead of their national counterparts, thus preserving a means for attaining a competitive advantage over
nationally chartered banks, federal legislators and regulators can easily
close these "loopholes" by either preempting the field or issuing competing regulations that level the playing field.4°
To some extent, the manner in which the U.S. banking system
developed has influenced the way politicians and commentators have
viewed the rank and importance of federal and state banking regulators,
Id. (finding no indication that Congress intended to render the use of the term "sav34.
ings" subject to local restrictions).
EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 22-23 (3d ed. 1991).
35.
Id. at 23.
36.
Id. ("The evidence suggests that it was the hope of Chase, if not of Congress as a
37.
whole, that the ten percent surcharge would force all state banks to refrain from issuing their
own notes, seek national charters, and circulate a uniform national currency.").
38.
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869) (upholding the constitutionality of the
tax and the power of the federal government to regulate in a discriminatory manner). Ironically, Secretary Chase, the chief proponent of the tax, later wrote the opinion for the Supreme
Court sustaining the legality of the tax. Id.
SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 35, at 23-24.
39.
A state's primary means of attempting to reestablish the semblance of parity with
40.
national banks comes through laws like "wild card" provisions that authorize state banks to
conduct any business that national banks are permitted to conduct. Forty-four states have such
statutes on the books. FELSENFELD, supra note 9, at 49. However, despite attempting to afford
state banks many of the same powers that national banks enjoy, "wild card" provisions have a
tendency to entrench the dominance of national bank laws. Id.
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regardless of the theoretical underpinnings of federal dominance in this
field. More specifically, because banks were originally exclusively
chartered at the state level, there is a residual sentiment that states should
continue to play an important role in bank regulation. However,
regulatory arbitrage 4' of the kind found in the U.S. market for corporate
charters does not exist in the banking sector because the market for
federal and state bank charters is not truly competitive.42
The federal government, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause and its
Commerce Clause powers, may preempt regulatory diversity or impose
regulatory uniformity in the banking sector as it pleases. 43 As a result, the
extent to which states are able to exercise their regulatory powers, above
and beyond their residual and limited police powers, is dependent on the
explicit or implicit authorization of Congress. States may not regulate in
an area if the judiciary deems the area occupied by Congress. Express
preemption occurs if the intent of Congress is clear with respect to a
given issue." Field preemption is implicated if congressional intent can
be inferred from the design of the federal law.45 If a state law interferes
with the policy the federal law advances, the federal law will preempt
the state law.46 Also, congressional statutes will frequently offer federal
regulators wide latitude to promulgate regulations that preempt state
laws.47 In practice, in instances where the statute is ambiguous, Chevron
deference provides federal regulators substantial latitude to clarify the
meaning of the statute through subsequent regulation. 48 Given the power41.
For the standard underlying true regulatory arbitrage, see Scott, supra note 8, at 13
("If the differences in regulatory options available to a bank create significant differences in

estimates of future earnings, the model predicts that banks will choose to convert to the most
profitable option if the costs of conversion are less than the increase in present value generated
by it.").
42.
See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677 (1988) (arguing against the existence of true regulatory arbitrage because of the underlying power dynamic of U.S. federalism coupled with
special interests influenced by path dependency).
43.
Id. at 694 (stating that the federal government has preempted state regulation with
respect to reserve requirements, investment banking services, and bank expansion into different product and geographic markets through holding companies).
44.
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
45.
Id. at 153.
46.
Id.
47.
See La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) ("[A] federal agency
acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation.").
48.
See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 153 ("Even where Congress has not
completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified ... when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.") (quotation omitted).
See also Andrew T. Reardon, Note, An Examination of Recent Preemption Issues in Banking
Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 347, 360 (2004) (remarking that in cases where the legislative delegation is implied rather than explicit, a "court may not substitute its own construction of a
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ful trump that U.S. federalism allocates to the federal government, federal regulators have significant power over their state counterparts,
undermining any notion of regulatory parity that the dual banking system's history may intimate.
This is not to say that the U.S. variant of federalism altogether forecloses the existence of regulatory arbitrage, as Congress does not always
choose to occupy the field when regulating financial services. For example, implicit in the McCarran-Ferguson Act,49 the principal statute
allocating to the states the power to regulate the insurance industry, is an
anti-preemption rule stipulating that a federal statute will not preempt a
state statute enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance," as long as the federal statute does not specifically relate to the
business of insurance.50
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a major
focus of bank legislation and regulation was to constrain competition
through geographic and product segmentation for largely prudential reasons. In light of this regulatory approach, Congress permitted states to
exercise their regulatory powers with respect to both state and national
banks operating under their jurisdiction. 5' As a result, banks had a degree
of latitude in selecting their regulatory environment by deciding where to
be regulated and under what regulatory authority to be chartered. The
potential for regulatory arbitrage was considerable because jurisdictions
had different rules and regulations on various banking activities. The
preservation of regulatory distinctions in the field of banking is dependent on the federal government refraining from passing preemptive
legislation.52 For example, when state banks were dropping out of the
Federal Reserve System because of its reserve requirements, the federal
government responded by enacting the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,"3 thereby imposing federal
reserve requirements on all banks.5

statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency")
(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
49.
15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2000).
50.
Id. § 1012(b) ("No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance.").
51.
See First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924) ("[N]ational banks are
subject to the laws of a state in respect of their affairs, unless such laws interfere with the
purposes of their creation, tend to impair or destroy their efficiency as federal agencies, or
conflict with the paramount law of the United States.").
52.
Butler & Macey, supra note 42, at 694.
53.
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
54.
See Butler & Macey, supra note 42, at 694-95.
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Apart from Congress' preemption power, the federal government offers state banks a carrot in the form of federal deposit insurance to elicit
their agreement to fall within its regulatory and supervisory umbrella
without requiring state banks to switch chartering authorities." This insurance scheme is open to both federal and state banks, conditioned on
the banks' acquiescence to submit to a broad range of federal regulation. Competitive forces pressure state banks to become members of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) because depositors overwhelmingly prefer FDIC protection in exchange for their deposits.57
Therefore, the federal government, through FDIC, can exert more regulatory pressure on state banks, even though Congress historically carved
out the regulatory domain over state banks with state authorities in mind.
Since the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, states are unable
to directly prevent an onslaught of federal legislation. Of particular
relevance is that states are no longer able directly to shape legislation
governing what national banks and state banks may do, and the extent to
which state regulatory authorities must refrain from regulating national
banks operating within their jurisdiction. When Congress chooses not to
exercise its regulatory jurisdiction in the field of banking, it does so not
because it is constitutionally constrained but rather out of deference to
the states' traditional interest in regulating their local banking sectors.5 9
Due to federal supremacy in the field of banking, the dual banking
system does not provide the level of competition its ideal suggests. The
system, however, preserves regulatory competition because sufficient
vertical competition, between federal and state regulators, and horizontal
55.
Apart from paying the requisite insurance premium, state banks are subject to
heightened federal regulatory scrutiny in return for insurance coverage. Many of these powers
were incorporated into the Federal Reserve Act from the National Bank Act, subjecting state
banks to national prohibitions such as "federal examination, interest rate ceilings on time and
savings deposits, cease and desist authority, and approval power over domestic branches and
merger acquisitions." Scott, supra note 8, at 6. If the federal government is on the hook for
insurance, states could exercise their regulatory jurisdiction to attract banks looking to switch
their charters. However, by federalizing much of the safety and soundness regulation (reserve
and capital requirements), the moral hazard is mitigated and a race to the bottom is prevented.
56.
See generally Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835 (2000) (protecting depositors up to $100,000).
See MACEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 107 (stating that although FDIC insurance is
57.
not required for state banks by law, practical business necessity demands that virtually all
banks acquire it). In addition, for preexisting depositors, the transaction costs associated with
switching from banks that do not provide FDIC insurance are relatively low, which puts pressure on banks to participate in the FDIC program if competing banks are also doing the same.
In relevant part, the Seventeenth Amendment states: "The Senate of the United
58.
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for
six years; and each Senator shall have one vote...... U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
59.
Cf Katherine M. Jones, Law, Politics, and the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:
The Case of Insurance Regulation and the Commerce Clause, 1938-1948, 11 CONN. INS. L.J.
345, 390-91 (2005).
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competition, among state regulators, is injected into the dual banking
system to promote regulatory arbitrage. 6° At times, national regulators
have even been alarmed by the extent of regulatory choice among federal
and state regulators. As Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Bums stated
in 1974, "[t]he present regulatory system fosters what has sometimes
been called 'competition in laxity.' ... I need not explain to bankers the
well-understood fact6that regulatory agencies are sometimes played off
against one another." '
In defending their regulatory powers, states can occasionally rely on
political safeguards of federalism. The significance of such safeguards
varies over time and is in part a function of the relative strength of the
banking lobby representing state banks, which is, in turn, dependent on
whether firms and individuals believe themselves to be better off with a
more geographically decentralized banking system where greater regulatory authority accrues to the individual states.62 When the political
safeguards of federalism are strong in the banking industry, state regulatory powers are substantially shielded from the exercise of congressional
preemption powers, and the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage and
state-level experimentation is enhanced. The extent to which the political
safeguards of federalism are in fact significant to the bank regulatory
scheme, however, can be viewed through the prism of public choice theory. Once a national consensus is achieved that favors circumscribing
states' use of their regulatory powers, the political safeguards of federalism weaken significantly. If one assumes that public choice resolutions
at the national level produce the most efficacious outcome for the country as a whole, the ease with which political safeguards of federalism are
set aside allows for welfare-enhancing regulatory evolution.

60.
Banks still switch chartering authorities, and, surprisingly, they do so about equally
in both directions from state to national and national to state, meaning that differences in regulation among states and federal regulatory authorities still matter. See FELSENFELD, supra note
9, at 28 (citing the example of the National Bank of Commerce of Memphis, which gave up
the national bank charter it had held since 1933, because by switching to a Tennessee state
charter, it would enjoy lower examination fees and have easier access to regulators). In addition, there is competition at the extremes on the federal level. For example, if the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency regulates in a manner extremely adverse to commercial banks,
these banks could decide to become thrifts and submit to the regulatory authority of the Office
of Thrift Supervision. See generally id. at 29. In other words, if the cost of the regulation exceeds the benefits over time, the regulated entity may simply choose another regulator.
61.
See Scott, supra note 8, at 12-13 (quoting Chairman Bums).
Alternatively, state banks can lobby Congress to legislate to obviate the impact of
62.
certain state regulations. This occurred with respect to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,
which provided that if an out-of-state bank establishes a branch in a state whose constitution
limits interest rates, the relevant constitutional provision will automatically be preempted. 12
U.S.C. § 183 1u(f) (2000).
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B. How the Underlying Asymmetric Power Dynamic
of U.S. FederalismHas Contributedto
the ConsolidationTrend
The underlying asymmetric power dynamic of U.S. federalism has
contributed significantly to the consolidation trend within the banking

sector in the United States. An illustration of this point is the manner in
which the system of regional restrictions on banks was sufficiently relaxed to a point where such restrictions no longer significantly impeded

market forces in deriving a markedly more profit-efficient institutional
banking arrangement.63 Although the relaxation of regulatory barriers to
consolidation has taken place in varying degrees, the liberalization of

geographic limitations on Bank Holding Company (BHC) expansion is
particularly salient because the ensuing dismantling of these restrictions

and the subsequent passage into law of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 199465 significantly reduced the
barriers to consolidation of the banking industry.66
The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act, enacted in 1956, limited acquisitions of banks by out-of-state BHCs to
instances where the acquisition of the bank was specifically authorized

by the laws of the state in which the acquired bank was located.67 Senator
Paul Douglas of Illinois sought to frustrate interstate banking by
"carry[ing] over into the field of holding companies the same provisions
which already apply for branch banking under the [small bank friendly]
McFadden Act. 68 States used the regulatory powers accorded to them by
the amendment, particularly the option of not authorizing acquisitions by
63.
See Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
BranchingEfficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. LEGIs. 255 (1995)
(at the time of writing, Mr. Mulloy served as Chief International Counsel for the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Ms. Lasker was a Legislative Assistant on the same committee).
64.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2000) (defining a bank holding company as any company "which has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank
holding company"). Limitations on geographic restrictions on BHCs allows such holding
entities to own state or national banks across the country, and served as the basis on which the
Financial Holding Company (FHC), whose activities and geographic reach is unprecedented
in the United States, was modeled. See generally MACEY ET AL., supra note 1,at 430-49.
65.
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108
Stat. 2338 (1994).
66.
See Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 63, at 255 ("This historic banking legislation
allows the formation of larger banks with extensive interstate branch networks by eliminating
many of the geographic restrictions currently placed on banks. This will result in a more efficient banking system in the United States which will ultimately enhance the competitiveness
of U.S. banks and companies.").
67.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (2000).
68.
See FELSENFELD, supra note 9, at 156 (citing the Douglas Amendment, 102 CONG.
REC. 6856 (1956)).
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out-of-state holding companies, to protect their state banking sectors.
This practice had the effect of confining an individual BHC to a single
state and impeding the BHCs from expanding nationally.
However, not all states maintained this practice over time. In 1972,
Maine adopted an "invitational" banking statute permitting out-of-state
BHCs into Maine if the BHC was based in a state that reciprocated in
kind.69 Such statutes had more symbolic effect than actual market effect.
By the 1980s, however, states began to form regional interstate banking
compacts that permitted out-of-state BHCs located in compactparticipating states to acquire banks within the compact. While these
compacts marked a clear trend toward a less encumbered nationwide
banking system, states with sizeable financial services industries, such as
New York, California, Illinois, and Texas, were often excluded from such
compacts.70 Professors Kroszner and Strahan found that on the state
level, deregulation occurred earlier in states with fewer and weaker small
banks and where dominant state insurance sectors did not block reform.7'
Although states played a role in recalibrating the relative value of geographic restrictions in a dynamic manner-largely by changing the
incentives on the state and regional levelsT--federal intervention was
nonetheless needed to bring about more fundamental reforms to interstate banking if a truly nationwide banking system was to emerge.
By the 1990s, the political safeguards of federalism that existed
when the Douglas Amendment was enacted were not as robust. Although
liberalization measures of the kind enacted by Maine allowed states to
serve as catalysts in the process toward achieving a national banking
market, it is worth underscoring that it was Congress that gave the states
discretion to enact "invitational" banking statutes and that had the power
to revoke such discretion and establish a uniform framework permitting
BHCs to expand nationally. In 1994, Congress passed the Riegle-Neal
Act, which repealed the Douglas Amendment, permitted BHCs to acquire a bank in any state, paved the way for the emergence of fullfledged interstate banking, and "administered the quietus to all remaining state legislation barring such expansion. 73
Many explanations have been offered for the emergence of a national consensus to liberalize state restrictions on interstate banking. It is
fair to say that it came about by virtue of a coalescence of political fac69.
See id.
70.
See id. at 158.
71.
Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation?Economics
and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1437, 1438
(1999).
72.
For further elaboration on the effect of such incentives, see id.
73.
MACEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 360.
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tors and an evolving socioeconomic consciousness in the political, academic, and business realms of the merits of a regulatory paradigm that
would allow for greater concentration in the banking system. These factors included concerns over whether a geographically dispersed banking
structure really served the national interest.74 One author argued that the
combination of national pride considerations relating to the perceived
need to create large banks to compete internationally with similarly situated banks-and the fact that a number of states had already dismantled
many of the geographic restrictions on interstate banking-was instrumental in the national decision not to impede the growth of larger banks,
instead facilitating a national consolidation process."
One could also view the change through the prism of public choice
and public interest theories of regulation. For example, consolidation
could have occurred as a result of a clash and subsequent victory of larger, expansion-oriented banks-backed by the American Bankers
Association and the Financial Services Round Table-over smaller
banks, supported by trade groups like the Independent Community
Bankers of America and the Savings and Community Bankers of America. Alternatively, Professors Kroszner and Strahan posit that innovations
such as automatic teller machines, checkable money market mutual
funds, and reductions in communication costs decreased the value of
geographic restrictions because consumers could increasingly do business with distant banks nonetheless.76 In sum, the "marginal value of
lobbying to repeal branching restrictions increased just as the relative
value to the small banks of maintaining branching restrictions was declining.' 7 7 The authors also found that the very same variables mentioned
above, which prompted deregulation on the state level, likewise
prompted the deregulation campaign on the national level.78 In addition,
deregulation of geographic restrictions reflected an incorporation of Chicago School economic theory into banking legislation, and more
generally, the growing adoption of the view that the impact of bank consolidation on borrowers and bank customers would be positive.7 9
See also FELSENFELD, supra note 9, at 161 (noting that in 1995, no American bank
74.
made the list of the top twenty-five largest banks in the world).
FELSENFELD, supra note 9, at 161-162 (positing that while Riegle-Neal was viewed
75.
as a victory to large banks, it was not seen as much of a loss to smaller banks that had been
opposing liberalization of geographic restrictions because, "through gradual state action over a
period of years and FIEAA, they saw the battle as already lost").
76.
See Kroszner & Strahan, supra note 71, at 1460-61.
77.
Id. at 1462.
78.
See id. at 1438.
79.
Compare Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS
USE IT 111, 128 (1933) ("[B]oth the financial concentration and the combinations which they
have served were, in the main, against the public interest .... [S]ize may, at least, become
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Congress structures the framework underlying regulatory arbitrage,
permitting the states to experiment and serve as the catalysts for regulatory innovation in the U.S. banking system, up to the point that the
federal government allows. Although states are limited in their ability to
compete with the federal regulators as a chartering authority, in the sense
that states do not want to provide too attractive a regulatory environment
so as to induce preemption of their competitive advantage, states can
nonetheless compete with each other where national banks are subject to
state laws.8 ° Given the consolidation trend over the past thirty years, state
regulatory regimes had the distinct opportunity to compete for the designation as the most efficient regulator. Where federal regulatory policy
allows for diversity, states have served as laboratories for financial innovation through regulatory action.
In the United States, however, the lobbying efforts of the dominant
banks seem to have won the day in the public arena. In reaction to this
development, the U.S. variant of federalism allowed for a quick shift in
regulation that facilitated the achievement of greater consolidation of the
banking industry, and moreover, the rapid growth of expansion-oriented
noxious by reason of the means through which it was attained or the uses to which it is put.
And it is size attained by combination, instead of natural growth, which has contributed so
largely to our financial concentration ....[Laws should be enacted to] escape from that inefficiency which is attendant upon excessive size. But what is far more important, we shall, by
such legislation, remove a potent factor in financial concentration. Decentralization will begin."), and Peter L. Struck & Lewis Mandell, The Effect of Bank Deregulation on Small
Business:A Note, 38 J. FIN. 1025, 1030 (1983) (suggesting that the credit needs of small businesses are less likely to be satisfied where the state allows banks to engage in wide geographic
activities because the bank structure may circumscribe the level of local decisionmaking), with
Allen B. Frankel & John D. Montgomery, FinancialStructure: An International Perspective,
1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY 257, 305 (1991) ("A product of the limits on the
geographical diversification of U.S. banks is a much higher failure rate.") (authors are members
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank), and Rebecca S. Demsetz & Philip E.
Strahan, Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding Companies, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 300, 312-13 (1997) (arguing that diversification provides an important motive for bank
consolidation because diversified banks can leverage their diversification advantage to operate
with lower capital rations and pursue riskier activities), and Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G.
Rajan, Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending, 57 J.
FIN. 2533, 2534-35 (2002) (arguing that the growth in distance between small firms and their
lenders and the growing impersonal nature of their relationship can be explained by technological change in the lending market; in the past small banks were needed to conduct strict ex ante
screening, while today larger banks can effectively conduct frequent ex post screening and
quick intervention) (Professor Rajan teaches at the University of Chicago Business School and
is one of the leading proponents of "financial development" and financial deregulation), and
W. Scott Frame, Aruna Srinivasan & Lynn Woosley, The Effect of Credit Scoring on SmallBusiness Lending, 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 813, 823-24 (2001) (positing that advances in information technology reduce information costs and asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders, developments that reduce the value of local lending relationships when
newer methods of lending like credit scoring are taken into account).
80.
See MACEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 120.
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banks. To foster regulatory uniformity, national bank regulators either
have to convince Congress to change features of bank regulation that
they do not find attractive, which is by no means an insurmountable obstacle, or they can act in a creative fashion by relying on Chevron
deference. The ease with which regulatory uniformity is achieved in the
United States once a national consensus exists is also distinguishable
from efforts in Germany to reform the German banking system in a way
that would promote static and dynamic profit efficiency through consolidation.
IV. THE IMPACT OF GERMAN-STYLED FEDERALISM ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BANKING SYSTEM

The architectural underpinnings of the German banking system, to
which the German Grundgesetz and the German variant of federalism
afford strong protection, serve, in a functional manner, as the principal
institutional arrangement that sets out to achieve many of the same public policy goals that influenced the development of the U.S. bank
regulatory system. In light of structural and constitutional limitations,
German federal legislative and regulatory powers in the field of banking
are subordinated, in various respects, to the legislative and regulatory
powers of the individual Lander and sub-Udnder governments. The
manner in which regulatory power is allocated provides these political
subdivisions an effective veto over the imposition of a regulatory scheme
that would have an overarching effect on the structure of the banking
system to the disliking of these political subunits. The inability to
achieve uniformity in regulatory approaches among the Lander, and
more importantly between the Lander and the Bund, prevents a more
consolidated market for banking services from emerging because actors
advocating fundamental change to the German banking system cannot
rely predominantly on their ability to influence central decisionmaking
to effectuate their reform agenda. Despite the growing acceptance of a
correlation between reform of the banking sector and an increase in economic welfare at the national level, champions of reform are relegated to
assuming a decentralized lobbying approach. The efficacy of such a lobbying approach is constrained by the reality that suggested reforms may
be perceived to run up against the interests of Germany's constituent
states and their respective political subdivisions.
The Lander and their subunits have the power to found and control
public banking instrumentalities through which many public policies are
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effectuated. 8' The manner and extent to which these public instrumentalities affect other market actors in the banking system, by allocating
capital along regional and subregional lines, creates a market effect that
does not exist in the United States. Consolidation of the banking system
is more difficult to achieve in Germany because public policies have
been ingrained into the structure of the banking system through the creation of subnational public-sector banks. 2 While the scope of the
subnational public-sector banks' mandate is to some extent nebulous,83
and because these entities have been accorded de facto constitutional
protection via their public backers, subnational public-sector banks
working in tandem with their backers can fend off or water down proposed paradigmatic regulatory changes that might otherwise dislodge the
public-sector banks from their coveted position as central actors in the
banking system.8 A factor contributing to this impasse is the close alignment of the interests of the subnational banks and those of the
decisionmakers-namely, Lander and municipal-level government officials-that could help authorize a move to bring fundamental change to
the German banking system. For example, even if one assumes the
achievement of consensus, however tenuous, on the national level in favor
of changing the structurally intrusive ways in which public policies are
realized in banking, the process of reform is nevertheless onerous because it must be embraced by the subnational backers of public banking
instrumentalities in order to be effectuated.8 ' These government backers
may be reluctant to conclude that such public policies, and the manner in
which they are implemented, are outdated, and may prefer to maintain
the current banking structure.
Given the coordination difficulties in achieving reform, fragmentation
and segregation of sizeable segments of the German banking market prevent the realization of efficiency gains.86 Similarly, the lack of scale in the
domestic retail banking operations of German commercial banks hampers
their profitability," given the dominance of the subnational public-sector
81.
82.
83.
ultimately
84.
85.
86.
87.

IMMENGA & RuoO, supra note 5, at 9-10.

See Guinnane, supra note 2, at 88-89.
IMMENGA & RUDO, supra note 5, at 10 ("The public mandate of Landesbanken is
not definable, but rather is subject to constant change.").
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See Lahusen, supra note 9, at 3-4.
BUNDESVERBAND DEUTSCHER BANKEN, BANKENVERBAND, BANKING SURVEY 2006

44 (2006), available at http://www.bankenbericht.de/pdf/2006/B-gesamt-engl.pdf [hereinafter
BANKING SURVEY 2006] ("The relatively weak earnings power of German banks is the result
mainly of structural problems on the German banking market, especially the fragmentation of
the domestic banking sector and restraints on competition and distortions of competition due
to the large public-sector share of the banking market."). But see Jan Wagner, The Other German Struggle-Germany's Political Battles May Be over but the War Over Reform of the
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banks in the German banking market." In light of the relatively high
density of banks in Germany,89 commentators have questioned whether
the subnational banks still require the unique public-sector support to
perform their capital-supply function and provide comprehensive services to the communities they have historically served. 90 More broadly,
the Bund's exercise of regulatory powers over subnational public-sector
banking is circumscribed to such an extent that the Lander and municipalities have become the principal entities capable of dislodging these
banks from their protected position. Yet these political entities have the
incentive to drag their feet in bringing about fundamental change to the
banking structure.
To understand the depth to which German federalism allocates regulatory power in the field of banking in favor of the Lander and subLander political subdivisions, it is necessary to look at the role of the
subnational public-sector banks in the German banking market. Section
A analyzes the salient structural features of the German banking market.
Section B discusses the constitutional constraints on the manner in
which reform of a type that would give rise to cross-pillar consolidation
can be conducted. Finally, Section C analyzes the considerable resistance to change on the part of the Lander and their political subunits,
giving rise to a formidable roadblock to consolidation of the banking
market.
A. Structure of the GermanBanking System
The German banking system is frequently referred to as a threepillar banking system because it consists of three distinct groups of
banks: the subnational public-sector banks, the commercial banks, and
the cooperative banks. 9' The largest pillar in terms of total bank assets is
the subnational public-sector banking group. This banking pillar includes roughly 600 local savings banks, known as Sparkassen, and
thirteen regional banks called Landesbanken. The Sparkassen and the
Country's Banking Sector Has Only Just Begun, THE BANKER (London), Dec. 1, 2005, at 1
("Constant complaints among big [commercial] banks that the three-pillar system is hindering
profitability is a red herring. The fact is that if you [commercial banks] have neglected the
domestic market for years, you shouldn't be surprised that you're not as successful.") (quoting
Thomas Fischer, then CEO of WestLB and President of the Association of German Public

Sector Banks).
88.

BUNDESVERBAND

DEUTSCHER BANKEN, BANKENVERBAND,

BANKING SURVEY 2004

11 (2004), available at http://www.bankenbericht.de/pdf/Bb_- 2004 %20en.pdf [hereinafter
BANKING SURVEY 2004]. See also Hackethal, supra note 13, at 82.
89.
See Lahusen, supra note 9, at 3.
90.
See IMMENGA & RuDo, supra note 5, at 7.
91.
Not included in this enumeration are special banks or federal-level public instrumentalities such as the Bundesbank or the KreditanstaltfiirWiederaufbau (KfW).
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Landesbanken control about thirty-four percent of the German banking
market; this figure, however, increases to forty-five percent when public
special-purpose banks, mortgage banks, and building and loan associations are included.92 While the structure of this banking group is a
reflection of the subdivisions of German federalism, with banking units
at the Bund, the Land, and the municipal levels, individual municipalities
and Lander exert substantial control over banks within their jurisdiction.
The individual banks within the subnational public-sector pillar enjoy
autonomy from one another, in light of their different ownership structure and restricted areas of operation. 93
In stark contrast to U.S. commercial banks and savings institutions,
which are incorporated under private law as either for-profit or nonprofit
entities, the vast majority of German subnational public-sector banks are
incorporated under public law and are owned and controlled by Lander,
municipalities, districts, and foundations that are in turn controlled by a
mixture of the first three above-listed government subdivisions. The activities of the banks in the subnational public-sector pillar are limited by
the Savings Bank Act of their respective Land, an act that generally focuses the banks' activities on helping out poorer and middle class
segments of the economy, and lending to public authorities.94 Embedded
in the Savings Bank Acts are geographic limitations, referred to collectively as the Regionalprinzip, which, by requiring Sparkassen to serve
the public interest of their respective community, limit their operations
such as branching to the geographic confines of the individual Sparkasse's controlling municipality.9" The types of activities in which these
public-sector banks engage largely mirror those of the commercial
banks, 96 except that the subnational public-sector banks tend to serve as
92.
See Association of German Banks, Market Shares by Category of Banks,
http://www.german-banks.com/html/12_banks-in-facts-figures/sub_01 _markt/ban_0511 .asp.
93.
Yet, if the banks were viewed as a whole, the combined entity, with three trillion
euro in assets in 2000, would be considered the largest financial institution in the world. See
Hackethal, supra note 13, at 81.
94.
See IMMENGA & RuDo, supra note 5, at 5-7. Usury laws, which are designed to
regulate the substantive fairness of the bargain under which credit is supplied, do not play
such a large role in Germany because the nonprofit maximization and community focus of the
banks ensure that interests rates will remain relatively low. This arrangement may, however,
crowd out other market participants that would supply capital up until the usury law ceiling on
interest rates.
95.
See Hackethal, supra note 13, at 79 ("[T]o avoid competition between local savings
banks, each institution is prohibited from operating outside its local area and encroaching
upon its neighbours' territories.").
96.
See Guinnane, supra note 2, at 88-89 (noting that at the outset of the twentieth
century, Sparkassen transformed into full-scale universal banks on account of legislative
changes that allowed this class of banks to offer checking accounts and underwrite and sell
securities).
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the Hausbank to the Mittelstand,97 whereas the commercial banks serve
as the Hausbank to very large, often publicly traded companies. 8
The second pillar is made up of the commercial banks, which include the likes of Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and Dresdner Bank.
These banks are incorporated under private law and are generally structured as universal banks, providing a wide palette of banking services.
The commercial banks control thirty-eight percent of the German banking market and operate throughout Germany. 99 Members of this pillar
have been the most vocal advocates for change to the banking system
and likely would have the most to gain from cross-pillar consolidation.
The third pillar comprises the credit-cooperatives, which are divided
into commercial credit associations, referred to as Volksbanken, and rural
credit associations, known as the Raiffeisenbanken. This pillar has a
twelve-percent share of the German banking market.'00 Creditcooperatives are incorporated as credit associations and can be compared
to mutual savings banks in the United States, where in return for choosing to further a social mission, they enjoy nonprofit status. The banks in
the credit-cooperative pillar are regulated under the Business and Trade
Cooperatives Act of 1889.'0° This pillar falls outside the scope of this
Note because of its relatively low market share and because creditcooperatives are controlled by their nominal owners and not by a level of
government. 0 2 Thus, the contours of German federalism are not implicated with respect to this pillar to the degree they are in the case of the
subnational public-sector banks.
With regard to the subnational public-sector bank pillar, backing from
Lander and municipalities provides the banks many advantages vis-A-vis
their counterparts in the other pillars while also protecting these banks
from potential Bund attempts to phase out such advantages. Subnational
public-sector banks are insulated from market forces because they are not
burdened by private shareholder pressure. Furthermore, subnational public-sector banks enjoy low dividend pay-out ratios, by virtue of their
undemanding public owners.' °3 In addition, due to past direct and current
97.
Mittelstand is the collective name for Germany's "traditional" small and mediumsized enterprise (SME) segment. The name does not necessarily correspond to the SME sector
in the United States because very large, family owned enterprises are often characterized as
members of the Mittelstand.
98.
See Hackethal, supra note 13, at 75, 79.
99.
See Association of German Banks, supra note 92.
100.
See id.
101.
Gesetz betreffend die Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften [Business and
Trade Cooperatives Act], May 1, 1889, RGBL. at 55.
102.
Hackethal, supra note 13, at 83 (stating the number of members to whom profits are
paid reached fifteen million).
103.
Hackethal, supra note 13, at 80.
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indirect Ldnder backing, public-sector banks' credit ratings are buttressed,' ° providing the banks with a distinct advantage over their private
sector counterparts in raising capital.
While subnational public-sector banks may acquire commercial
banks, commercial banks may not acquire public-sector banks.' 5 Given
their status of incorporation, public-sector banks are shielded from hostile acquisition, rendering them immune to short-term profit maximizing
pressures of the sort that commercial banks face. This advantage may
also translate into more stable relationships between these banks and
their clients, an important advantage in banking generally. Given these
distinct advantages, this market structure does not promote a level playing field in the German and the European market for banking services
and hampers inter-pillar consolidation.
As a result of these advantages, the Ldnder, by supporting this
banking arrangement, are causing certain externalities to be felt
throughout Germany. Such externalities most acutely affect the
commercial banks. By virtue of their public ownership status,
subnational public-sector banks may be able to offer banking products at
overly competitive rates, which allegedly hurt the profitability of
commercial banks by squeezing margins to "unattractive levels."' 6 The
subnational public-sector banks are able to impose lower margins on
their competition, and by increasing their market share, 7 subnational

104.
Although the credit ratings of the Landesbanken have taken a hit since the rollback
of explicit Lander guarantees as part of the Understanding About the Orientation of Legally
Independent Special Credit Institutions in Germany between Mario Monti, Commissioner for
Competition, and Caio Koch-Weser, State Secretary in the German Ministry of Finance,
(reached on Mar. 1, 2002 in Brussels) [hereinafter Understanding between Monti and KochWeser], they are, however, higher than they would otherwise be if they were not affiliated with
a Land. See Finance and Economics: Deep Impact; German Landesbanks, ECONOMIST, Nov.
29, 2003, at 109 (reporting that Fitch, a credit rating agency, will take into account implicit
guarantees when issuing its ratings of Landesbanken).
105.
See BANKING SURVEY 2006, supra note 87, at 44.
See id. See also Hackethal, supra note 13, at 80. This negatively affects German
106.
banks internationally because they have to compete vis-A-vis other banks with strong home
market positions. This makes German commercial banks more reliant on income from international operations, which tends to fluctuate dramatically. See also Marcus Walker, Losing
Interest: As Crisis Looms, Big German Banks Blame iny Rivals-Adding to Economic Malaise, Majors Cede Rich Market to State-Backed Lenders-When Profits Aren't the Point,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2003, at Al (providing anecdotal evidence of bank customers turning to
Sparkassen for more affordable loans). Thomas Schwarzbauer, the head of a local Sparkasse
detailed his lending philosophy: "My philosophy is: How would I feel about the bank's decision if I was in the customer's position." Id.
Manfred Weber, The German Banking Market: L Structural Change, DIE BANK:
107.
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BANKPOLITIK UND PRAXIS, July 2002, at 6, 11, availableat http://www.diebank.de/media/062002/its062002.pdf (demonstrating that Landesbanken have been expanding
lending to domestic firms at the expense of the commercial banks. Since the early 1990s, the
Landesbank market share in the corporate lending business has risen from 9.8% to 17.5%).
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public-sector banks may crowd out commercial banks from important
banking business. '
B. The Impact of the German ConstitutionalStructure
on the Development of the Banking System
The German constitutional scheme, which provides the Ldnder considerable power and discretion in many fields in accordance with the
system of "cooperative federalism," offers substantial protection to the
regulatory autonomy of the backers of the subnational public-sector
banks. Because the formation of many public-sector banks predated the
Grundgesetz, its provisions and protections largely mirror, at least in a
functional way, past protections accorded to this segment of the banking
sector," Article 74 of the Grundgesetz affords the Ldnder and the Bund
concurrent legislative power in the realm of banking. Article 72 states
that the Ldnder's ability to exercise concurrent powers is dependent on
the condition that "the Federation does not use its legislative power."'" °
Since the field of banking is a concurrent power, the Bund can only act if
it is supported by the Bundesrat, the council comprising the Ldnder representatives." The Bund can only enact regulation with respect to a field
of concurrent legislation if such regulation is deemed necessary. Article
72(2) states:
The Federation has the right to legislate on these matters to the
extent that a need for a Federal rule exists because (1) a matter
cannot be effectively dealt with by the legislation of individual
Ldnder, or (2) dealing with a matter by Land law might prejudice the interests of other Ldnder or of the entire community, or
(3) the maintenance of legal or economic unity, especially the
maintenance of uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of a Land necessitates it."2
The Bund has not used these powers in contravention of the
Lander's role in regulating subnational public-sector banks, except in a
perfunctory manner. For example, the Bund has enacted legislation con-

108.
See BANKING SURVEY 2004, supra note 88, at II (arguing that Landesbanken are
able to offer loans "on conditions which do not even remotely reflect market realities").
109.
While the first savings bank was incorporated in 1801 in Gottingen, the Prussian
Savings Act of 1838 circumscribed the legal independence of all 238 Prussian savings banks,
placing control of the banks under the local governments in the areas of their respective operation. Hackethal, supra note 13, at 78.
110.
Grundgesetz, May 23, 1949, art. 72.
111.
See infra Section C. (discussing impediments to Bundesrat action due to disincentives affecting the Lander).
112.
Grundgesetz, May 23, 1949, art. 72(2).
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cerning banking supervision." 3 Likewise, given the support of the publicsector banks at the Linder level, it would be difficult to conceive of the
Bund fitting such legislation into one of the three above listed categories,
and then receiving Bundesrat support to legislate in a manner that is materially adverse to the integrity of the three-pillar banking system.
A cursory glance of these constitutional provisions might compel the
erroneous conclusion that the Bund, assuming it had sufficient support
from individual Linder comprising the Bundesrat, could just impose on
the subnational public-sector banks a new corporate form and mandate
that they privatize. A somewhat similar approach occurred in Italy when
the Italian government passed the "Ciampi Law" in 1999, which prohibited foundations from holding majority stakes in savings banks and
provided tax incentives to smooth out the disposal process."'4 An analogous approach would not produce a similar effect in Germany, however,
because the German Constitution in Article 28(2) bestows on municipalities and counties the right of self-government,' which affords these
political subdivisions the discretion to establish savings banks in the form
of public instrumentalities." 6 As a result, subnational public-sector banks
113.
See Jens-Hinrich Binder, Regulatory Competition Between the Deposit Insurerand
a Single Financial Regulator-The Case of Germany, 39 INT'L LAW. 3 (2005) (discussing
federal regulatory authority of a supervisory and prudential nature over all three pillars of the
banking system).
See Andrea Goldstein, Privatization in Italy 1993-2002: Goals, Institutions, Out114.
comes, and OutstandingIssues 27-28 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 912, 2003) (claiming that
the loophole in the legislation is that foundations can still team up to control banking institutions).
115.
See Grundgesetz, May 23, 1949, art. 28(2) ("The Communities must be guaranteed
the right to regulate on their own responsibility all the affairs of the local community within
the limits set by law. The associations of communities also have the right of self-government
in accordance with the law within the limits of the functions given them by law.") (translation
available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt).
See IMMENGA & RUDO, supra note 5, at 29 ("The guarantee of autonomous ad116.
ministration [in Article 28(2)] gives the municipal administration broad discretion in choosing

between a public-law or private-law legal form.");

HORST DREIER,

2

GRUNDGESETZ KOMMEN-

art. 28(2), annot. 151 (2006) ("Das Sparkassenwesen ist als Komponente der
Daseinsvorsorge Teil der Kommunalaufgaben und daher verfassungsrechtlich geschutzt. Die
Gemeinden konnen somit selbstverantwortlich iber den Betrieb der Sparkassen und den
Umfang der sparkassenwirtschaftlichen Betatigung entscheiden*"); ALBERT VON MUTius, 4
BONNER KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ art. 19(3), annot. 136 (1974).
TAR

Sparkassen Ober eine
kommunaler
Ein mittelbarer Grundrechtsschutz
Grundrechtssubjektivitait ihrer kommunalen Gewahrtrager entf'llt wegen des
Vorrangs des Art. 28 Abs. 2 GG von vomherein, weil derartige kreditwirschaftliche
Aktivititen durch Gemeinden, Gemeindeverbande und kommunale Zweckverbande
vom ,Wesensgehalt' der Selbstverwaltungsgarantie in Art. 28 Abs 2 GG erfaBt
werden, so daB den Gewahrtragern gegenfiber die Geschaftstitigkeit und die
einschrankenden
Aufgaben der kommunalen Kreditinstitute substanziell
MaBnahmen durch diese Verfassungsnorm ausreichender Schutz garantiert wird.
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are shielded from legislation analogous to the Ciampi Law. Moreover, it
would likely be politically difficult to garner the necessary two-thirds
majority in both the Bundesrat and Bundestag to amend the constitution
in a manner that would mollify the impact of the self-government provision of the German constitution as it applies to the subnational publicsector banks."7
While the exercise of federal law and regulatory powers affects this
pillar of the banking industry insofar as it performs a supervisory function, such exercise of regulatory powers cannot impact the legal
structures of subnational public-sector banking instrumentalities or associations in a fundamental sense. Rather, Lander law typically applies if
such instrumentalities or associations perform a function of the Lander,
commune, or municipal level, which is certainly the case when each
subnational public-sector bank is viewed individually."8
German Linder circumscribe the scope of the banking entities' activities through what is referred to as the Savings Bank Act, or
Sparkassengesetz. Generally, a Land's savings bank law limits the geographic operations of such banks, restricts their profit-orientation, and
promotes the allocation of credit and banking services to the middle
class and the poor." 9 In September 1994, the German Federal Constitutional Court, relying on the self-governance provision of Article 28(2),
confirmed the constitutionality of a Land's power to define such Sparkasse functions.' 20
Id. (parenthetical text omitted).
117.
See Grundgesetz, May 23, 1949, art. 79.
118.
See id. art. 72. Conversely, if an instrumentality or association fulfills a public function at the federal level, for example the Bundesbank, federal law would serve as the basis for
its establishment.
119.
For a translation of the North Rhine-Westphalia Savings Bank Act, which is typical
of other savings bank laws, see IMMENGA & Runo, supra note 5, at 6.
1) Savings banks are business enterprises of local authorities or local authority associations charged with the function of serving the credit needs of the people and
the economy, and particular of the business sector and of their guarantor. (2) Savings banks strengthen competition in the credit business. They promote the people's
sense for saving and their formation of wealth, as well as responsible behavior on
the part of youth in financial matters. Savings banks contribute to the financing of
debtor advisory services offered by consumers or debtor advisory bureaus; the
guarantors determine the scope of distribution of these funds to the authoritics of
the advisory bureaus. The credit supply serves chiefly to provide credit to the middle class and weaker economic segments of the population. (3) The business of
savings banks, subject to their public mandate, is to be conducted in accordance
with general business principles. The realization of profit is not the main purpose of
business operations.
Id.
120.
See id. at 9 (quoting Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], Sept.
23, 1994).
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The Ldnder, acting as federal actors in the Bundesrat, could establish a facilitative framework that could offer incentives or remove certain
obstacles to formal privatization of the Lander-level public-sector banks.
2
For example, through the Bundesrat,1
1 the Lander could support changes
to the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) that would allow privatized savings banks to use the label "savings bank." 2 2 However, the Bund
would not be able to implement or even induce broad-based consolidation by mandating privatization because of the self-government rights
accorded to municipalities and counties.
C. Lack of Interest in the Lnder to Support Reform
of the Three-PillarSystem
Even if the Lander could, through the Bundesrat, collectively promote fundamental change to the underpinnings of the financial system,
these constituent states lack the incentive to authorize such legislation.
An individual Land does not have a strong incentive to effect change to
the structure of the subnational public-sector banks operating within its
regulatory jurisdiction. Even assuming for a moment that an individual
Land decided to amend its Savings Bank Act to allow publicly backed
banks to privatize, such an approach would constitute mere formal privatization. Material privatization, in which the public interest in the
Sparkassen or Landesbanken is actually sold, would be necessary to create any significant market effect. A move to materially privatize these
banks would be contingent on whether individual local jurisdictions

Irrespective of the legal independence of savings banks, they have remained, due to
organizational interlacement, local institutions with whose help communities and
administrative districts can fulfill part of their function of providing comprehensive
public services. In particular, they are supposed to rouse and promote the people's
sense for saving, to provide them with opportunities to invest money securely, and
to supply credit, with particular consideration for the middle class and weaker economic segments of the population.
Id.
121.
Grundgesetz, May 23, 1949, art. 50.
122.
See Kreditwesengesetz [Banking Act], Jan. 5, 2007, BGB1. I § 40. Notwithstanding
the recent European Commission-Germany Agreement on Sparkassen stating that "Section 40
of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) will be applied in a manner that does not
infringe the provisions of the EC Treaty on the right of establishment (Articles 43 et seq.) and
the movement of payments and capital (Articles 56 et seq.)," the agreement does not alter
Section 40. Moreover, any Sparkasse that undergoes privatization is still subject to public
service obligations, and whether future privatized Sparkassen can use the name will be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Press Release, European Commission (EC), Agreement on
"Sparkasse" (Dec., 6, 2006); Banking: Deal Reached on Sparkassen Privatisation,EUR. REP.,
Dec. 7, 2006. These barriers, which could be alleviated through legislative changes to the
German Banking Act, render an acquisition of a savings bank by a private bank less attractive,
assuming that such an acquisition would be permitted in the first place.
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decide that privatization of these banks is in their respective interest. In
view of the coordination costs involved and the fact that localities might
have serious reservations about selling their interest in the savings banks
they control, the shear amount of time and energy a privatization process
would require constitutes the most prohibitive hurdle to material privatization, which in turn impedes any inter-pillar bank sector consolidation
process.
A Land could do a lot to win favor among the commercial banks; for
example, it could amend its savings bank law in a manner that benefits
the private sector. However, unlike the case of individual U.S. states, a
Land does not lose much by not catering to nonpublic-sector banks.
Likewise, municipalities that back Sparkassen likely would not overwhelmingly support a privatization scheme because of the utility they
derive from merely maintaining the status quo. Or, at a minimum, these
political subdivisions may feel that they would be adversely affected by
fundamental deviations from the existing banking arrangement, a sentiment that may dictate a preference for continuity. These preferences are
significant not just at the Sparkassen level but also at the Landesbanken
level because organizations of municipality-backed Sparkassen exert
control in conjunction with the individual Lander governments on the
respective Landesbanken within their control.' 23
In addition, given that commercial banks are already crowded out of
a fair share of banking business, the threat of a commercial bank exiting
a Land or, metaphorically, of commercial banks voting with their feet, is
just not credible. Any banking business that would be lost on account of
the exit of a commercial bank could arguably be compensated for by
entry of the subnational public-sector bank to fill the gap, as the service
that the respective banks provide are, more or less, substitutable.'2 1 On
the surface, such an outcome might be even more preferable for the
Land, which would be the controlling entity of an expanding bank.
Moreover, at the local level, the commercial banking industry is not well
positioned to "capture," or even cajole, the locality or Idnder government. One exception might be the state of Hesse, given the number of

123.
See IMMENGA & RuDo, supra note 5, at 9-10 ("In each state the founding body of
the Landesbanken is, albeit in varying proportions, the respective state, the respective savings
bank and transfer associations, and regional associations of corporate bodies.").
124.
HANNES SCHNEIDER & HANS-JURGEN HELLWIG, THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM
14 (1978) ("Contrary to what their name implies, [the subnational public-sector banks] more
or less perform the same all-round services as private commercial banks, although with particular emphasis on their traditional activities, namely the acceptance of savings deposits and
real estate lending business.").
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commercial banks housed in its largest city, Frankfurt, and the collective
lobbying strength that these banks possess.' 5
While subnational public-sector banks are not allowed to grant local
or Land authorities preferential treatment, these banks still serve the
credit needs of their controlling authority.'2 6 An International Monetary
Fund report found that because control of Landesbanken is vested in
public officials, there are cases where loans are not "strictly screened on
the basis of creditworthiness.' 27 Such a conclusion should not come as a
surprise, given the ability of the founding entity, as the owner of the
bank, to control who sits on the bank's supervisory board.' 28 As a result,
many politicians sit on supervisory boards of subnational public-sector
banks. Such arrangements, however, may result in a misallocation of
capital to the benefit of the Land's local economy, but perhaps to the detriment of the national economy.
The subnational public-sector banks, in particular the Sparkassen,
have played the role of the Hausbank for Germany's sizeable small and
medium-sized enterprise (SME) market segment, better known as the
Mittelstand.29 Providing a steady flow of lending to the Mittelstandsomething that the commercial banks have been accused of refraining
from doing' 3 -strengthens support among the general population for the
subnational public-sector banks because the Mittelstand is collectively a
125.
The government of Hesse is planning on amending its Savings Bank Law to liberalize rules on who may buy subnational public-sector banks. Although this might be a first step
toward privatization, the fact that prospective purchasers will be limited to members of the
public-sector banking group shows that even in Hesse, the strength of the public-sector lobby
and its supporters is very strong. See Anja Struve & Norbert Schwaldt, Hessen mischt den
Sparkassensektorauf" Gesetz soil den Verkauf der Institute ermoglichen, DIE WELT, Mar. 30,
2006, at 12. Members of the commercial banking sector, however, believe that Hesse is not
going far enough in promoting privatization. See Klaus-Peter Miller, President of the Ass'n of
German Banks and Chairman of the Bd. of Managing Dirs., Commerzbank AG, Spring Press
Conference: Stay Firmly on the Path of Reform (Mar. 15, 2006) (translation available at
http://www.german-banks.com/html/15-press/press-00-060315.asp) ("[T]he planned legislation certainly falls short of the private banks' expectations concerning the modernisation of the
German market").
126.
IMMENGA & RUDO, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that savings banks allocate fifteen
percent of their credit to public budgets). In 1993, public banks had a 52.7% market share of
loans to public budgets. Id. at 3.

127.

INT'L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP'T, COUNTRY REPORT

No. 03/286,

7
(2003).
128.
The executive board, which is charged with the management of the bank, reports to
the supervisory board, two-thirds of which the founding entity selects. The founding entity is
able to influence important credit decisions through the credit committee, which includes at
least three supervisory board members. See Hackethal, supra note 13, at 79.
129.
See id. at 95.
130.
See id. (remarking that the large commercial banks are withdrawing from traditional commercial loan business, focusing on investment banking and commercial banking to
large corporations).
GERMANY: REPORT ON OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS

AND CODES-FISCAL TRANSPARENCY
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major employer in individual Ldnder. The commercial banks assert,
however, that this system leads to systemic underpricing of their lending
arrangements with Mitteistand firms.' Subnational public-sector banks
may still be able to provide such firms with underpriced credit in light of
their "unfair" ability to raise capital through implicit guarantees, irrespective of the fact that, after the EU agreement on the phaseout of
guarantees, 32 these public-sector-backed banks no longer derive explicit
guarantees from the individual Land in the form of Anstaltslast (mainte3
nance obligation) and Gewiihrtrdgerhaftung(liability obligation).
More overtly, subnational public-sector banks, particularly those at
the Land level, participate in the organization of local economic solutions to preserve control over firms based in the backer's jurisdiction.
One illustrative example involved the sale by Allianz, a major German
insurer, of a large equity stake in the Hamburg-based consumer goods
manufacturer Beiersdorf. '3 Shortly before the sale of the equity stake,
the American consumer goods giant Proctor & Gamble not only showed
strong interest in acquiring Allianz's stake in the company, but also in
acquiring the remaining outstanding shares of Beiersdorf, an outcome
that would have enhanced shareholder welfare. However, an unofficial
consortium led by Tchibo, a family controlled Hamburg-based coffee
company and major shareholder in Beiersdorf, preempted Proctor &
Gamble's purchase of the company by acquiring Allianz's stake. As a
result, German ownership of Beiersdorf was preserved. However, because Tchibo's financing options were considerably limited relative to
those of Procter & Gamble, and because Tchibo's controlling family
lacked the financial muscle to acquire all of Allianz's stake, Tchibo's
controlling family had to participate in the organization of an informal
consortium of stakeholders, the members of which would all share the
same goal of consummating the deal to Tchibo's favor, against the "outsider" Procter & Gamble."' To facilitate this deal, Beiersdorf bought
back 7.4% of the stake, and members of the traditional ownership coalition decided to acquire more of the stock than they had originally
131.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
132.
Understanding between Monti and Koch-Weser, supra note 104.
133.
See Finance and Economics: Deep Impact; German Landesbanks, supra note 104
and accompanying text.
134.
For background information, see Edward Taylor & Sarah Ellison, Smooth Operation: With Nivea at Risk, Old German Club Swings Into Action-P&G Showed Interest in
Stake Allianz Planned to Shed; "We Are in Your Way"-A Lesson for Sanofi's Team?, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 19, 2004, at Al ; Edward Taylor & Neal E. Boudette, Tchibo and City of Hamburg
Place Bid to Control Beiersdorf,WALL ST.J., Oct. 13, 2003, at B2; Edward Taylor, Beiersdorf
Workers Erect Takeover Roadblocks-Employees Move to Prevent A Benefit-Rich Tradition
From Being Swept Aside, WALL ST.J., Oct. 1, 2003, at B5.
135.
See Taylor & Ellison, supra note 134.
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planned.'3 6 Ultimately, however, Beiersdorf's independence was secured
by the Hamburger Gesellschaft fOr Vermdgens- und Beteiligung (HGV),
a holding company controlled by the city of Hamburg, which acquired a
ten-percent stake in Beiersdorf.3 7 Interestingly, in devising a national
solution, Hamburg's finance senator worked "hand in hand" with Alexander Stuhlmann, the head of HSH Nordbank, a subnational publicsector bank.' This illustration points to the role Landesbanken play in
supporting the vestiges of German Industriepolitik. Even the mere expectation that they stand ready to organize local economic solutions
provides this banking pillar with residual support at the Land level.
The opposition on the regional level to taking the initial steps necessary to change the German banking structure was recently illustrated by
the difficulty in privatizing Sparkasse Hansestadt Stralsund, a savings
bank located in the structurally weak eastern part of Germany. 39 This
incident shows that even where there is support among the savings bank
owners at the municipal level, a regional government can step in and
block the privatization scheme. In the Stralsund case, the regional government of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania strongly opposed a sale,
fearing that it would precipitate a piecemeal dismemberment
of the
40
Sparkassen Group by "cherry-picking" commercial banks.'
In late 2003, the government of Stralsund expressed an interest in
privatizing the local Sparkasse, the Sparkasse Hansestadt Stralsund.'4 '
Due to the precedent-setting implications that would result if the Sparkasse were successfully privatized, an open and intense battle among
numerous interest groups ensued. Commerzbank and the Swedish banking group SEB, in addition to other commercial
banks, showed particular
42
interest in acquiring the Stralsund Sparkasse.
Still, notwithstanding the eagerness on the part of the local backers
of the Stralsund Sparkasse to sell the bank, the regional government of
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania strongly opposed a sale, fearing the
ramifications such a sale would have on the subnational public-sector
banking pillar. Sigrid Keler, the Finance Minister of Mecklenburg-

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Gregory Lipinski, Die Staatskapitalisten,HANDELSBLATT, Oct. 24, 2003, at 8.
Id.
For background information, see Patrick Jenkins, Savings Banks' Hopes of Privati-

sation are Dashed, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 19, 2004, at 26.

140.
See Wagner, supra note 87, at 1.
141.
See Patrick Jenkins & Thibaut Madelin, Stralsund bank sell-off foiled, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 3, 2004, at 28 (reporting that Stralsund's mayor suggested a sale of the Stralsund Sparkasse as a way of improving the city's finances).
142.
Id. (reporting that Commerzbank lamented, "[i]t is a shame that the opportunity to
consolidate across the 'three pillars' will not now happen in the foreseeable future.").
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Western Pomerania, made a pointed comment to the FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, one of the most important German dailies:
The three-pillar model proved itself in Germany and is economically advantageous for the country. One only has to take a look
at England for this to be recognized. The Sparkassen, which
generate their income primarily in their respective regions based
on the regional principle, play a large role in structurally weak
regions such as Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The region of
Stralsund, as pointed out by statements made by Mr. Ackermann
[the CEO of Deutsche Bank] and Breuer [the former head of the
supervisory board of Deutsche Bank], is of limited interest to the
large banks
[Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerz43
bank].'
A spokesman for Mr. Ringstorff, the prime minister of MecklenburgWestern Pomerania added:
If we had let Stralsund's Sparkasse be sold off to a private
bank, that would have been the end of public banks in Germany
....The terrible thing about that is that the private banks, captive to capital markets, only buy Sparkassen that are profitable
and have a big client base. They don't care about remote areas,
so those people and SMEs suffer.'"
This controversy was ultimately put to rest when the regional government of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania passed a new law on the
regulation of the Sparkassen, which more clearly vested decisionmaking power with respect to any future privatization scheme with the
Land government. 45 The enactment of the new law reflected the general
opposition on the Land level to any rash moves that may serve as a
precedent for more significant and encompassing privatization schemes.
Keler made it clear that the Sparkasse Hansestadt Stralsund was not for
sale:
The Sparkasse is incorporated under public law. The Hansestadt
Stralsund is not the owner under private law; rather it is the
founding entity. The rights of the founding entity are circum143.
Hanno MuBler, Sparkassen-Verkauf Nicht Erlaubt, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Dec. 2, 2003, at 14 (interview with Sigrid Keler, Finance Minister of MecklenburgWestern Pomerania) (author's translation).
144.
Wagner, supra note 87, at 1.
145.
See Stralsund stoppt Verkauf der Sparkasse; Biurgerschaft beugt sich neum Gesetz,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG,

Mar. 3, 2004, at 13 (detailing the motivations and

content of the new Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Spakassengesetz); Sparkasse Stalsund
vor Fusion, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Oct. 15, 2004, at 20.
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scribed by the Savings Bank Act. The Savings Bank Act of
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania gives the founding entity the
possibility of merging the Sparkasse with another Sparkasse.
The Savings Bank Act does not allow the founding entity to sell
the Sparkasse in whole or in part .... Also, the winding-up of
the Sparkasse is clearly provided for in the Savings Bank Act. It
is dependent on, among other things,4 6approval by the [Land's]
finance minister and interior minister.
Given the difficulty of effecting inter-pillar consolidation due to constraints related to the German variant of federalism, the German
commercial banks circumvented the German political system by lodging
a complaint with the European Commission in 1999 via the European
Banking Federation, asserting that the state guarantees enjoyed by subnational public-sector banks constitute impermissible state aid.' 47 On
March 1, 2002, Mario Monti, the European Union Commissioner for
Competition, and Caio Koch-Weser, the German Minister of Finance,
reached an agreement to phase out the maintenance and liability obligations, which provided public-sector banks a distinct advantage in raising
capital.' 48 Underscoring the role that Ldnder play in EU policy, State
Secretary Kock-Weser was joined by the finance ministers of North
Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, and the president of
the German Savings Bank trade association.14 9 Despite the unsuccessful
privatization attempt in Stralsund, the growing importance of the European Union as a forum for evaluating behavior presumptively in
violation of the EU internal free market or other treaty commitments was
underscored by the city of Stralsund's attempt to pbtain EU iptervention
on the grounds that Mecklenburg-West Pomerania's move to change the
Savings Bank Law impeded the freedom of settlement and capital
movement in the European Union.5 The role the European Union might
play in the future in abolishing implicit guarantees to subnational publicsector banks remains an open question. German commercial banks may
very well take the reform path that passes through Brussels to effectuate
all-encompassing reform of the kind necessary to induce a significant
Id. (author's translation).
146.
See German Banks Lose State Backing, DEUTSCHE WELLE, July 19, 2005.
147.
148.
Understanding between Monti and Koch-Weser, supra note 104. Notwithstanding
the agreement, the public-sector banks still have a foot up vis-A-vis their private-sector counterparts due to implicit guarantees.
149.
Press Release, European Union, Germany Agrees on the Implementation of the
Understanding with the Commission on State Guarantees for Landesbanken and Savings
Banks (Feb. 28, 2002).
150.

Local Ministry Extends Suspension on German Stralsund Savings Bank Sale, HAN-

DELSBLATT (F.R.G.),

Jan. 20, 2004.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 28:431

inter-pillar consolidation process, as the prospects for convincing the
linder to adopt a reform agenda are remote.

V. U.S.

FEDERALISM WOULD NOT SUSTAIN

A THREE-PILLAR BANKING SYSTEM

Unless the U.S. Congress steadfastly supported a scheme analogous
to the banking system in Germany and explicitly manifested such intent
by reducing it to writing in the form of legislation, U.S. courts would not
uphold the state regulatory powers necessary to create and cultivate a
three-pillar-styled banking system. Given the path dependency of the
U.S. regulatory system and economy, any moves to establish a banking
structure similar to that in Germany would be superseded by one underlying policy aim frequently articulated in U.S. jurisprudence: creating a
national market unencumbered by protectionist state legislation and
regulation.'5 ' The pursuit of this theme is inherently incompatible with a
banking system like that of Germany, where the free flow of capital
among the constituent states is significantly encumbered. The Supreme
Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as applied to the
banking sector provides a sense of the opposition in the United States to
such a scheme. Granted, such comparisons leave something to be desired
because in Germany, the Ldnder, by virtue of the Savings Bank Act, restrict the purchases of public banks by private banks, rendering the point
of contention one that revolves around a public-private dichotomy. In the
United States, however, the focus of the relevant jurisprudence relates in
pertinent part to states protecting private banking entities located in their
state against banks located in other states. As the Court stated in Granholm v. Heald, "[t]ime and again this Court has held that, in all but the
narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they
mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.' ,,52 In the United
States, Congress would have to permit such activity, and Congress would
surely revoke its permission if it found, for example, that a hypothetical
scheme analogous to the German three-pillar banking model was having
an adverse effect on the national economy and impeded U.S. productivity vis-a-vis its international counterparts.
U.S. states have tried to prevent entry of national banks into certain
banking areas. For example, Bankers Trust, a New York-based bank,
151.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 501 ("In
dormant Commerce Clause cases, there is often consideration of the importance of a national
market economy unrestricted by protectionist state laws.").
152.
544 U.S. 460,472 (2005).
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sought to establish an investment management subsidiary in Florida.'53
The Florida legislature responded by enacting legislation that prohibited
an out-of-state bank holding company from owning or controlling a
business in Florida that sells investment advisory services, even though
the Federal Reserve Board had deemed the provision of investment or
financial advice as "closely related" to banking within the meaning of
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.' The Supreme Court, with
Justice Blackmun writing for the majority, struck down the Florida legislation.'
Blackmun reasoned, "[t]he statute makes the out-of-state
location of a bank holding company's principal operation an explicit barrier to the presence of an investment subsidiary within the State .... [Ilt
thus prevents competition in local markets by out-of-state firms with the
kinds of resources and business interests that make them likely to attempt de novo entry."' 5 6 Notwithstanding Florida's interest in preventing
economic concentration in high finance, protecting its residents from
fraud, and "maximizing local control over locally based financial activities," Blackmun stated:
In almost any Commerce Clause case it would be possible for a
State to argue that it has an interest in bolstering local ownership, or wealth, or control of business enterprise. Yet these
arguments are at odds with the general principle that the Commerce Clause prohibits a State from using its regulatory power
to protect its own citizens from outside competition.'
As long as Congress remained silent on the subject, the Dormant Commerce Clause would prevent Florida from establishing a regional
banking system insulated from competition from bank holding companies from other states.
The Supreme Court similarly constrained the states in Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors,5 " in which Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, reasoned that "an individual State acting
entirely on its own authority would run afoul of the Dormant Commerce
Clause if it sought to comprehensively regulate acquisitions of local
banks by out-of-state holding companies.' ' 59 Rehnquist distinguished the

153.
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155.

Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
Id. at 30-32.
Id. at 27-28.

156.

Id. at 39.

157.
Id. at 43-44.
158.
472 U.S. 159 (1985).
159.
Id. at 174 (distinguishing states acting in a categorical discriminatory manner on
their own authority from states acting based on the authorization of Congress, as was the case
with respect to the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act, rendering the
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constitutional status of a state action that is discriminatory and based on
its own authority from a similar state action that is based on
authorization from Congress.' 6° These jurisprudential precedents,
coupled with constitutional constraints, point to the legal difficulties in
establishing an analog to the three-pillar banking system in the United
States.
VI. CONCLUSION
The distinct variants of federalism in the United States and Germany
lead to a different distribution of regulatory authority between the federal
government and the constituent states. If the assumption that a certain
degree of consolidation in the banking system is necessary to promote
profit efficiency is valid, the U.S. regulatory system, given its less diffuse and federal government-biased form of federalism with respect to
banking, is more malleable. As a result, the U.S. scheme of federalism
sets the stage for dynamic change to bygone regulatory paradigms that
deferred in large part to the regulatory preferences of U.S. constituent
states. The scope of deference that existed was influenced by political
safeguards of federalism rather than by constitutional stipulations. Although federal powers are constrained to a degree by political safeguards
of federalism, such safeguards are relatively easy to overcome if the
right bargain is struck at the federal level. As a result, market actors are
better equipped to prod the establishment of a more profit-efficient structure in the United States, as long as their
position is supported by a
6
critical political mass at the federal level.' '
In the United States, real regulatory power is ultimately stored in the
federal government. To the extent that interstate competition exists by
virtue of the dual banking system, its effect is limited by federal regulatory powers and by national consensus, however tenuous. In Germany,
by giving effect to public policies at the structural level, the vehicles
through which such public policies are implemented, namely the subnational public-sector banks, enjoy a sense of permanence, and the threepillar system is therefore more firmly entrenched. The varying degrees of
protection afforded to the status quo banking structure by Germany's
state's subsequent discriminatory act based on authority flowing from the Douglas Amendment invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause).
160.
In Northeast Bancorp, the latter was the case, as the Douglas Amendment to the
Bank Holding Company Act rendered the discriminatory act invulnerable to constitutional
attack under the Commerce Clause. Id.
161.
A cynical view would posit that regulatory capture is more difficult in Germany,
given that the system fosters the dispersion of decisional power to the local and regional levels.
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variant of federalism give the status quo further permanence. The policy
goals underlying geographic restrictions and the Regionalprinzip are
very similar. In the United States, however, once a critical mass of opposition to these kinds of restrictions arose at the national level, it was easy
to dismantle the regulations and forge a new market structure. This is not
the case with respect to the Regionalprinzip, despite a comparable critical mass of academics, politicians, and private sector actors who oppose
its underpinnings and advocate change. As a result, in the field of banking, the inflexibility of German federalism imposes a constraint on the
profitability and efficiency of the commercial banking pillar and arguably the banking sector overall.

